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# The Perennial *Methodenstreit*: Observation, First Principles, and Economics

Julian Reiss, Durham University

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\* As a phil So, going back to economics, there is a wide range of controversy in economics (e.g., should we use monetary or fiscal policy to fix a recession?), but there is also a wide range of agreed-on views, such as that we should have free trade and avoid price controls.

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- \* These proposals tend to rely on the existence of good knowledge of at least some uncontroversial facts, including some economic facts
- \* My question today: Is there such a thing as good knowledge of uncontroversial economics facts?

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
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
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- \* What I hope to show is that answers to questions such as these are **oftentimes a lot less clear cut** than optimists like Brennan suggest

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
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- \* Instead of deducing general economic laws from highly abstract principles (and, at best, testing them against some narrow contemporary data), he insisted that conclusions should be founded on a wide observation of contemporary facts and aided by the study of history
- \* Specifically, he found that 'laws' could be context dependent: dependent on the different forms that the ownership and cultivation of land, and the conditions of production and distribution, assume at different times and places

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- \* What if you can't randomise? Use a 'second best': instrumental variables, difference-in-differences, regression discontinuity...

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  - \* Structuralists: by affecting a smoker's spending decision, taxation may affect other causes of lung cancer after all, e.g., exercise and nutrition

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#### The Caral Wars

Until the Card-Krueger study, most economists, myself included, assumed that raising the minimum wage would have a clear negative effect on employment. But they found, if anything, a positive effect. Their result has since been confirmed using data from many episodes. There's just no evidence that raising the minimum wage costs jobs, at least when the starting point is as low as it is in modern America.



Three conclusions, in particular, stand out. First, as indicated in chapter 3, the literature that has emerged since the early 1990s on the employment effects of minimum wages points quite clearly—despite a few prominent outliers—to a reduction in employment opportunities for low-skilled and directly affected workers.

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- \* So we're back to square one

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  - \* Most importantly, however, the historical record indicates that free trade isn't always advantageous

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The imposition of free trade on Portugal killed off a promising textile industry and left her with a slow-growing export market for wine, while for England, exports of cotton cloth led to accumulation, mechanisation and the whole spiralling growth of the industrial revolution

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Moreover, it is also not true that
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free-market policies. The truth is more or less the opposite.
With only a few exceptions, all of today's rich countries,
including Britain and the US – the supposed homes of free trade
and free market – have become rich through the combinations of
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  - 1. Be epistemically humble!
  - 2. Take a broad view of evidence!
  - 3. Take a broad view of the question to be addressed!
  - 4. Make your case for a specific historical situation!

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- \* Ignorance and mischief are only two among many possible explanations of disagreement

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- \* Therefore: look at **all the evidence** that is relevant to addressing a policy question and weigh it up

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- \* The goal should be to weave all the evidence together into an overall narrative which is convincing in its entirety

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- \* This also makes clear that **value judgements** play an important role in evidential reasoning

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- \* What's good for a country will depend, among other things, on its level of development, size, existing institutions, laws, and customs, cultural factors and so on